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Muslim Migration to Australia and the Question 
of Identity and Belonging 
Fethi Mansouri 
Introduction 
The encounter between Islam and Western civilisation is not a recent 
phenomenon. Certainly it is not solely a product of recent migratory 
movements, though twentieth-century migration has accelerated the 
pace of Muslim migration to the West. Indeed, Muslim civilisation 
reached the southern parts of Europe as early as the seventh century 
and is still strongly entrenched within Europe today in the form of 
independent states such as Bosnia Herzegovina and significant 
Muslim minority groups in the case of France, Germany, the UK, 
Holland and other states. Therefore, the current negative discourse 
towards Islam and Muslims living in the West is not only linked to 
recent political developments but can be traced to a history of 
confrontations that stretches from the crusades in the twelfth 
century to Napoleon's expedition into Egypt more than five centuries 
later. But history and historical events alone cannot account for the 
current impasse that characterises the relationship between Muslims 
and the West. In fact, the years following the events of September 11 
have witnessed a number of incidents that once again generated 
strong exclusionary discourses towards Islam and Muslims in 
general, and those present in Western societies in particular. As this 
chapter will argue, in the case of Australia, this discourse has been 
framed in the context of local threats to Australia's national security 
and social cohesion symbolised by the perceived influx of the 'boat 
people', the spread of 'Lebanese gangs' in Australian suburbs and the 
associated fear of 'global terrorism'. The historical and empirical 
insights from recent research illustrate that these new discursive 
tendencies cannot be overcome by means of a strictly normative 
citizenship approach. 1 
Despite the adoption of the policy of multiculturalism, and a 
general acceptance of migrant groups since the 1970s2, Australia has 
recently been described as a country where exclusionary discourses 
and practices are now notable, most obviously towards Arab and 
Muslim minority groups.3 In fact, the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC) report findings corroborated the 
views of several studies regarding the social concerns held by Arab 
and Muslim Australians and the subsequent threat this poses to 
intercultural relations.4 The HREOC inquiry reported growing levels 
of discrimination and xenophobia experienced by Arab and Muslim 
Australians since the September 11 and Bali terrorist attacks.5 While 
respondents confirmed that the majority of non-Muslim Australians 
uphold multicultural ideals regardless of the changed international 
political atmosphere, the interviews conducted as part of HREOC's 
research exposed disturbing reports of individual acts of discrimina -
tion and/or racism in contemporary Australia. The incidents cited 
ranged from verbal abuse to examples of personal attacks (such as 
being spat upon or Muslim women forcibly having their veils 
removed), or the destruction of both private and public property.6 
More recently, research on social cohesion in Australia has 
revealed an increased shift in negative attitudes towards immigra-
tion.7 The research found strong and persistent negative attitudes 
towards asylum seekers in the range of 60-70 per cent, as well as an 
increase in the negative attitudes towards immigration intake from 
35 per cent in 2009 to 47 per cent in 2010.8 Most interestingly, and in 
terms of attitudes towards migrants from particular ethnic back-
grounds, the study found that the negative attitudes are almost six 
times higher from immigrants from the Middle East (19.9 per cent) 
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than they are for either English-speaking (3.5 per cent) or European 
(3.2. per cent) immigrants.9 
Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses the historical pres-
ence of Muslim migrants in Australia and explores their current 
social experiences and the impact of recent global and domestic 
political events on their representations in political and public 
discourses. This chapter uses historical accounts as well as current 
empirical research on attitudes towards Muslims and Islam in 
Australia. Drawing on pre-Federation as well as contemporary 
debates on national identity, citizenship and belonging, I argue that 
perceptions and images of Muslims in contemporary Australia 
cannot be viewed as solely the product of recent global politics. 
Instead, they are also the consequence of government social policies 
such as restrictive asylum seeker policies and related negative media 
coverage that still echo exaggerated pre-Federation anxieties about 
the security threats of migrants from Asia and the Middle East. 10 
While it is not always evident that historical continuities 
regarding the discursive representation of any particular group can 
persist across decades, even centuries, as Said shows in his influen-
tial book Orientalism, the Western skewed view of Islamic and Arab 
culture has been sustained by stereotypes, misconceptions and an 
assumption of cultural superiority. 11 Within the Australian context, 
recent research shows a persistent-if not increasing-level of 
discrimination and racial vilification experienced by Muslim 
Australians, in particular in the aftermath of the September 11 and 
Bali terrorist attacks. 12 Despite the relatively successful adoption 
and implementation of multiculturalism since the 1970s13, Australia 
has recently been described as a country where exclusionary nation -
alist discourse is increasingly prevalent, most notably vis-a-vis 
Muslim migrants. 14 
Recent research findings corroborated the views of several 
earlier studies15 regarding concerns held by Muslim Australians and 
the implications of this for their social integration and wider inter-
cultural relations. These concerns included the provision of adequate 
legal protection from discrimination; the lack of culturally relevant 
education at both the secondary and tertiary levels; the problematic 
approach of the media to Islam and (by association) the various 
Muslim minority groups; scepticism regarding equitable law 
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enforcement practices; and the re-emergence of exclusionary media 
discourses. 16 
Muslim Migration to Australia 
The earliest presence of Muslims in Australia can be traced back to 
fishermen from Makassar in the east- Indonesian archipelago who 
had been visiting the north coast of Western Australia, the Northern 
Territory and Queensland from as early as the seventeenth century.17 
Later and during the early white settlement, 'names of Muslim 
sailors, convicts and settlers can be found listed in various records, 
however evidence of their continued settlement in Australia is 
absent'. 18 Surprisingly, little research has been undertaken to place 
this early presence within the social and economic framework of 
nation-building that shaped post-Federation Australia. Despite the 
recent publication of a number of studies on Arab and Muslim 
Australians, early Muslim settlement in Australia remains a neglected 
topic in mainstream historical studies. 19 This dearth of academic 
inquiry is further illustrated in the lack of seminal studies being 
carried out on early Muslim settlement along the lines of the exten-
sive historical analyses undertaken on the representation of Chinese 
and Asians in Australia prior to Federation. Indeed, numerous histor-
ical studies have focused on the racialised representation of Asians 
and other migrants in literary and media discourses (see, for 
example, Walker 1999), while similar studies of Muslim migrants in 
pre-Federation Australia have yet to be undertaken in a rigorous way 
though Stevens's study (1989) of Afghan migrants remains an excep-
tion in this regard. 20 But given that many European explorations 
across the Australian outback were guided by thousands of Afghan 
camel drivers in the nineteenth century21 , the issues connected to 
their early experiences still need to be explored in a more systematic 
manner to uncover the level of racial and physical abuse they 
endured at the time. 
For example, and as a result of the economic tension arising 
from the introduction of cheap 'coloured' labour, 'an Afghan 
cameleer was shot dead by a European teamster as he was washing 
before performing the sunset prayers'. 22 This and other concerted 
efforts by workers and journalists led eventually to more restrictions 
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on Afghan and other Muslim workers being allowed into Australia 
ultimately culminating with the introduction of the Immigration 
Restriction Act of 1901. 
Following the adoption of this legislation that became known as 
the 'White Australia Policy', the non-British source of migration was 
stopped and the Afghans, among other non-British settlers, found it 
increasingly difficult to secure employment and acceptance in the 
wider Australian society, suffering racial vilification and social isola -
tion. Lebanese immigration to Australia similarly began in the 1870s 
and '80s, though early Lebanese migrants identified themselves as 
Syrians and were categorised as 'Asians' under the Immigration 
Restriction Act of 1901.23 While they passed the eligibility test for 
immigration, they were nevertheless excluded from applying for 
'naturalisation', the equivalence of current Australian citizenship. 24 
As recent studies have shown, Afghan cameleers were the first 
victims of anti-Muslim sentiments in Australia who, as early as the 
latter parts of the nineteenth century, endured a major negative 
media campaign due to racial and economic tensions with Anglo-
Australian bullock drivers. 25 At the same time, campaigns against 
Indian and Syrian hawkers in capital cities along the eastern 
seaboard resonated with wider colonial campaigns against members 
of the Chinese community. For example, in 1898 the Melbourne 
newspaper Leader ran a major public campaign against Indian and 
Syrian hawkers, linking these settlers to a narrative of criminality, 
disease and the bullying of housewives. Similarly, the editor of the 
Coolgardie Miner newspaper, FCB Vosper, 'played on anti-Afghan 
feelings in his editorials, and in December 1884 [he] received the 
support of 2000 miners in his proposal to establish an Anti-Afghan 
League ... to exert pressure on government and local councils to have 
the Afghans, and other Asians, removed'.26 
Post-Federation immigration and citizenship legislation, 
reflecting these tensions, did introduce restrictions that resulted in a 
reduction of Muslim presence in Australia to insignificant numbers, 
though the target group for such restrictions were Asians in the first 
place.27 The racial discrimination and internment of enemy migrants 
during World War I saw Lebanese and Syrians categorised as 'Turkish 
subjects' and thus were portrayed as a potential security risk to the 
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nation. Such racial discrimination was openly practiced under 
the pretext of cultural homogeneity, social cohesion and the 'national 
interest'. 
Not surprisingly, Muslim migration did not recover until after 
World War II when, initially, the largest groups of Muslims to migrate 
to Australia were from Turkey and the Balkans and thus were not 
perceived to pose a major cultural challenge to the White Australia 
ideology. However, in more recent times, owing to civil wars and 
armed conflicts in the Middle East and as a result of Australia's adop-
tion of a more flexible multicultural policy, Arab and Muslim 
migration from different parts of the Middle East and South East Asia 
has increased. 
At present, across this wide spectrum of immigration intake, 
there are around 340,390 Muslims in Australia, representing 1.7 per 
cent of the total population.28 The most frequently spoken non-
English language used by Australian Muslims is Arabic, which 
indicates that the largest ethnic group within Muslim communities in 
Australia is of Arabic-speaking background with 243 662 speakers 
representing the fourth-largest language in Australia other than 
English.29 Although Australian Muslims come from more than thirty 
different countries, the largest proportion (38 per cent) is Australian-
born with almost 40 percent being under the age of twenty.30 
Australian Muslims live mainly in the metropolitan centres of Sydney 
and Melbourne with the majority classified as working class.31 Socio-
economic indicators32 suggest that Muslim Australians occupy both 
socially and economically marginal positions in the Australian 
society.33 This can be seen in terms of employment outcomes and 
house ownership. Ironically, the take-up rate of Australian citizenship 
for Muslim migrants in general and those born in Middle Eastern and 
North African countries in particular has been above the national 
average suggesting a strong commitment to the Australian nation.34 
Muslim Australians and the Politics of Multiculturalism 
Discursive representations of migrant groups in Australia have often 
tended to be manifested in diametrically opposed directions.35 
Migrants are either virtually ignored in the mainstream media 
coverage, which effectively denies their membership among the 
urban citizenry, or their activities are presented as irrational, 
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negative or violent, which frames minority groups as collectively 
problematic and, therefore, inherently un-Australian. A good 
example here is the recent debate about banning the burqa in 
Australia.36 This is partly why it may appear contradictory that many 
Australians simultaneously appear to take pride in the culturally 
diverse nature of their society while giving political support to more 
conservative policy approaches to multiculturalism and national 
identity debates. 
The ambiguous and sometimes difficult intersection of such 
fluid notions as identity, nationalism and multiculturalism can create 
particular instances of exclusionary discourses and practice, if not 
government policies. Some have argued that this is an outcome of a 
new globalised politics of neo-capitalism that has played a role in 
eroding society's capacity to generate care for others and distribute 
hope for a better future. 37 This is because states have become 
'managers' of national economies to the detriment of the wellbeing 
of their citizenry, whose feeling of economic vulnerability results in a 
public discourse dominated by a language of worry, insecurity and 
defensive border policing. This fear about oneself and the nation 
then manifests as a form of paranoia and total indifference to the 
suffering of those excluded from the national imaginary on the basis 
of their cultural difference. 38 
Little wonder then, that any perceived targeted policy (a la 
affirmative action) towards migrants or other minority groups rarely 
garners popular support from a majority of the Australian public. 
This is evidenced, for example, in the heated debates about 
Indigenous land rights or economic support directed at particular 
ethnic groups.39 Yet a liberal discourse on equality and equal oppor-
tunity has been commonly supported and openly preferred by policy 
makers, many groups within civil society, and the general public. The 
Whitlam-led Labor Government officially enacted multiculturalism 
in Australia as a policy in 1973 though it was not incorporated into 
the national agenda until the Fraser years and its humane approach 
to the 'boat people' crisis when thousands of Vietnamese refugees 
were settled in Australia. Yet, more than thirty years later the former 
Prime Minister John Howard dismissed the very term 'multicultur-
alism', when he expressly favoured 'cultural diversity' instead: 
'[Multiculturalism is] not a word I use a lot, but there is no other 
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word. I mean I tend to talk about cultural diversity. I tend to talk 
about people's different heritage'.40 As indicative of this kind of 
general retreat from multiculturalism in public policy, in 2007 the 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs changed its 
title to the 'Department of Immigration and Citizenship'. 
The retreat from using the term 'multiculturalism' in favour of 
the more normative term 'citizenship' has become a symbolic basis 
for generating a new form of political nationalism. Overall, new poli-
cies of citizenship as a basis for Australian national identity 
encourage a discourse of shared values as contributing to social 
cohesion rather than promote the intrinsic value of cultural diversity 
and anti-racism. The policies of any Australian government, often 
supported by certain sections of the media, have the capacity to 
shape public attitudes and views towards Muslim and other migrant 
communities.41 For example, one of the outcomes of the reduced 
emphasis on cultural diversity and anti-racism has been a growing 
editorial acceptance of racist comments directed towards Muslim 
Australians in Australian media. Such anti-Muslim sentiments flared 
most recently during December 2005 when Anglo-Australian whites 
attacked Lebanese Australians at Sydney's southern Cronulla Beach 
in a bid to 'reclaim the beach'. Signs and t-shirts worn by the nearly 
5000 rioters, most of Anglo Celtic background, read discriminatory 
phrases such as 'Kill the Lebs', 'no more Lebs', 'get Lebs off the beach', 
'F ... k off, Lebs' and 'F ... k off wogs'.42 Indeed, many Australian news-
papers openly criticised Muslim heritage, categorised Lebanese 
youth as 'un-Australian' and upheld notions of a white Australia 
through their images, online discussion sites and sensationalised 
headlines.43 
At such a difficult time for multicultural Australia when strong 
leadership is needed to correct such racist and discriminatory atti-
tudes, the political leadership opted to remain largely silent, treating 
these events as a law and order issue, and in the process contributed 
to undermining further intercultural relations and social harmony. 
Notwithstanding the Cronulla riots and their aftermath, signs of 
a weakening support for multiculturalism in Australia, at the level of 
policy enactment at least, have been most evident in the gradual 
retreat of multicultural services from government agencies to the 
voluntary sector. The Australian government has in recent years 
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channelled funds to a select cohort of community groups and local 
NGOs, allowing them to control settlement and support services that 
affect newly arrived migrants and refugees. One of the problems of 
shifting settlement services that were once provided though state-
endorsed policies of multiculturalism to NGOs and community 
groups is that small community groups are not always fully equipped 
or resourced to cope with the systemic problems that immigrants 
face in terms of anti-racism, social exclusion and discrimination.44 
Whereas once multiculturalism included support for cultural 
diversity, anti-racism legislation and social inclusion, now-post-
September 11-multiculturalism in Australia is almost exclusively 
synonymous with a new emphasis on tributary citizenship rights, 
socio-economic integration and social cohesion. 
The conservative backlash against multiculturalism is a trend 
detected in other multicultural societies in the West such as the UK 
and Canada. There are widespread fears that the presence of a large 
number of newcomers and their claims for recognition will inher-
ently corrode solidarity and economic conditions of the majority 
groups. Fears of this kind have led to more restrictive immigration 
policies and tighter controls on access to citizenship. The general 
argument has been that multicultural policies emphasise and 
support ethnic culture, which undermines the sense of a common 
national identity, and a common national identity is necessary for a 
robust welfare state.45 Such ideas reflect a widespread perception of 
immigration as a threat and a burden to emigre societies that must 
be managed, contained or minimised. In general, Australia's accept-
ance of non-white migrants has been fragile with an early record of a 
tendency towards exclusion and assimilation as evidenced in the 
Immigration Restriction Act of 1901. The following section examines 
how these cumulative historical developments have affected the lives 
of Muslim migrants in contemporary Australia. 
The Social Experiences of Muslim Australians 
Anti-Muslim sentiments and actions are often reproduced through a 
racialised discourse that is sustained by corrupted understandings 
and articulations of national identity and political belonging. Like 
other non-European early settlers, Muslim migrants to Australia have 
historically faced considerable cultural and political obstacles in 
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their attempts to access equal citizenship rights and fully integrate 
into mainstream Australian society. These historical obstacles have 
become all the more challenging in the current political climate that 
emphasises social cohesion and raises concerns about the potential 
divisive nature of cultural diversity. Within this policy approach to 
diversity, external conflicts in the Middle East often have a negative 
impact on Muslim Australians, some of whom have fled these very 
conflicts for a more secure future in Australia. Muslims are, therefore, 
caught up in exclusionary representations about their communities 
often portrayed as a possible threat to social cohesion in Australia. 
This representation has led to a more prominent discourse of 
demonisation, misrepresentation, mistrust and exclusion aimed at 
Australians of Muslim and Arabic backgrounds. 46 
Recent research has highlighted a high level of antagonism and 
intolerance towards Muslim Australians in the way they are perceived 
by the broader mainstream society. One such study surveyed over 
5000 residents in Queensland and New South Wales in December 
2001, and found that anti-Muslim and anti-Middle Eastern senti-
ments were very strong, with both communities mentioned most 
commonly as groups that respondents believed did not fit into 
Australian society.47 Moreover, non-Muslim women were more 
concerned about marriage of a non-Muslim woman to a Muslim 
man than vice versa, suggesting that 'Muslims suffer quite dramati-
cally from the stereotypes oflslamic misogyny/sexism'.48 Not only did 
the findings show that high degrees of hostility are felt towards 
Muslim Australians, they also indicated that spontaneous, non-
formal types of racism are experienced frequently by many 
Australians, such as disrespectful treatment, mistrust and labelling 
or name-calling. The survey suggested that a significant proportion 
of Muslim Australians experienced these types of racism through 
everyday social interaction.49 More specific accounts of attacks and 
vilification of Muslim Australians, particularly women, can be widely 
located, though these tend to be second-hand accounts. 
A number of recent reports of Muslim Australians' social experi-
ences seem to support such accounts including specifically: being 
subjected to verbal and physical assault; women being intimidated 
and patronised; receiving hate mail, obscene phone calls and death 
threats; the firebombing of mosques and the inciting of hate in the 
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media, particularly on talkback radio.so Muslim women in particular 
appear to be targeted for two main reasons. First, those who wear a 
hijab tend to be individuals who are the most physically and visibly 
identifiable with Islam.51 Second, Muslim women are sometimes 
viewed by some Australians as subservient, complicit in their own 
oppression by a patriarchal religious and cultural order, and conse-
quently are patronised if not openly despised. 52 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the media coverage of 
these issues is that many commentators seamlessly fuse events in 
the Middle East together with outbursts of discrimination and racism 
against Muslim Australians.s3 The correlation seems, to some media 
commentators at least, to be obvious; however, it is worth exploring 
more deeply how these members of the Australian community have 
come to be implicated in events that in reality are far beyond their 
control. This might be understood through the conflation of Muslim 
and Arab, the lack of understanding of Islam in Western cultures and 
the presentation of Islam as a homogenous entity that is now associ-
ated with terrorist targeting ofWesterners.s4 As previously argued, it 
might also be regarded as part of a more general conservative back-
lash against multiculturalism, reviving fear and deep suspicion of 
Australians with multiple cultural and national allegiances, particu-
larly those who are visibly different. Ironically, the isolation that has 
been almost forced upon some members of the Muslim Australian 
communities has been interpreted as a rejection of and dissociation 
with 'Australianness' and as evidence of loyalty to religious and polit-
ical orders that are thought to represent the 'enemy' of the West.ss 
Xenophobic rhetoric towards Muslim Australians, however, cannot 
be solely viewed in the context of recent world events, as these 
communities in Australia have suffered exclusion and prejudicial 
treatment that is also reflective of a broader problematic Western 
discourse on Islam.56 
Some Empirical Insights 
The specific forms that racialised practices and representations 
towards Muslim migrants take and how they may be accounted for 
vary considerably. One recent study shows that negative sentiments 
vis-a-vis Muslim Australians remain at high levels.57 This study 
included a sample of 584 participants with 262 respondents to the 
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internal survey within the Darebin local council, representing 
approximately 33 per cent of the total staff numbers; 300 interview-
style community surveys of 10-15 minutes duration among a 
stratified sample of Darebin community residents; and twenty-two 
individual interviews with Council employees, community leaders 
(including religious leaders and spokespersons of relevant NGOs in 
Dare bin), local business owners and general community members. 
The interviewees were selected according to four types of variables: 
demographics, connection to Muslim communities, gender and 
geographic location. The purpose of these interviews was to gain an 
in-depth qualitative perspective on the views and attitudes of 
community and business leaders vis-a-vis multiculturalism, Islam 
and Muslim Australian communities. 
The study's findings show that the majority of the respondents 
felt empathy towards Australian Muslim communities and acknowl-
edge that they have been targeted because of recent international 
events. There is nevertheless evidence of misperceptions, stereotypes 
and some negative views of Muslims within the community. These 
views are directly related to the international security context post-
September 11 and have translated into both direct and indirect forms 
of discrimination. Many Muslim Australians reported incidents of 
verbal harassment and social avoidance and in some cases outright 
discrimination and physical attacks. There is a feeling among 
members of the Muslim community that they have been deliberately 
singled out by the Australian Government and consequently are 
increasingly viewed with suspicion by mainstream society and 
media. The incidents of harassment and discrimination were 
described at length in the individual interviews held with Muslim 
leaders of the local community who complained about lack of under-
standing and knowledge of Islam in Australian society. 
The table below summarises the levels and sources of main-
stream knowledge of Muslim Australians. Participants were presented 
with a range of responses from 'I don't know anything at all' about 
Muslims, to statements that indicated that they had 'learned about 
Islam from family and friends'. 
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Table 1: General Knowledge of Muslim Australians 
General knowledge of Muslims Community 
comes from .••. respondents Staff (Difference) 
a) I don't know anything at all 0 2.7 -2.7 
b) My family or extended family 15.0 8.4 6.6 
c) Friends 43.0 27.4 15.6 
d) Books I read 38.3 31.4 6.9 
e) My own life experiences 54.7 44.7 10 
f) Observing people in the 43.7 55.3 -11.6 
neighbourhood 
g) The media (TV; Press, Radio) 71.3 79.2 -7.9 
h) Other 17.0 10.6 6.4 
Total (N) (300) (262) 
Only 2. 7 percent of the staff respondents and no community 
respondents stated that they had no knowledge about Muslims. More 
than 70 percent of the community respondents and 80 percent of the 
staff respondents stated that their knowledge of Muslims came 
primarily from the media. This may explain why the role of the media 
has been such a concern to Australian Muslim leaders in their 
attempts to promote a positive image of Muslim communities in 
Australian society. 
Respondents were then asked (on a scale of zero to ten) about 
their level of agreement with a range of specific statements formu-
lated to test their perceptions of Muslim groups in the Darebin 
community and their knowledge and understanding of Islam. The 
sentiment of each of these statements, both positive and negative, 
was taken from opinion pieces published in The Age and The Herald 
Sun shortly after the London subway bombings in July 2005. They 
touched on various issues ranging from the question of whether or 
not Islam is compatible with democracy, the perception of Muslim 
women who choose to wear a hijab and the logic of blaming all 
members of a particular group for the actions of a few extremist indi-
viduals. These fifteen statements can be divided into four broad 
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categories: statements about the behaviour of individuals, state-
ments about the rights of Muslims, statements about Muslim 
groups and statements about international terrorism and safety. 
Given the scope of this paper, the following discussion will only 
focus on the statements addressing perceptions of Muslim 
Australians and Islam.58 
The survey data show that the majority of respondents are 
comfortable having contact with, interacting with or employing 
Muslims. Respondents overall agreed that they would live next door 
to a Muslim with a community ratio of 8.39 and a staff ratio of7.9 out 
of a possible 10. Even more respondents were comfortable with the 
idea of visiting a Muslim home, with this statement receiving a 
community ratio of 8.64 and a staff ratio of 8.3. However, the data 
also shows that there were societal limits to what people viewed as 
minority rights. For example, staff and community respondents were 
extremely divided over whether Muslim families should have the 
Figure I: Islam is Not Compatible with Australian Values 
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right to keep their children out of classes for religious reasons, with a 
ratio of 5.08 and 5.6 for community and council employees 
respectively. 
The negative statement, 'Islam is not compatible with Australian 
values', similarly received a community mean of 3.19 and a staff 
mean of 3.5. The aggregate ofresponses are categorised in Figure 1. 
The significant number of responses selecting the 'can't say' 
option could suggest a number of underlying issues: that respond-
ents were uninformed about Muslims in general; that they were 
unwilling to give support for a negative statement about Muslims in 
a face-to-face survey; or that respondents were unwilling to gener-
alise about Muslims and that different interpretations of Islam could 
have different degrees of compatibility with Australian values. 
Similarly, it could also reflect an unwillingness to generalise about 
the meaning of Australian values. 
While the research showed an overall high level of support for 
Muslim Australians, it nevertheless highlighted some problematic 
negative findings in relation to the understanding of Islam (and the 
sources of such understanding and knowledge) and the simplistic 
association of Muslim Australians with international Islamist groups 
such as terrorist organisations.59 
Conclusion 
The political discourse in certain Western countries in relation to 
conflicts in the Middle East has led to a problematic association of 
Islam with 'extremism, intolerance and violence'. 60 Such a causal 
association between the creeds of Islam and Arabs on the one hand, 
and political violence and oppression on the other, has not been 
constructed solely as a result of September 11 and subsequent 
events. 
Certainly the negative discourse has been heightened in the 
aftermath of the recent terrorists attacks, though it must be empha-
sised that it is by no means a new addition to the continuum of 
Western discourse on Islam and the Arabs. Within a social context 
of claustrophobia about multiculturalism and the slow loss of 
'Australianness', malicious generalisations about and denigration 
of Islam have become acceptable in Western media and public 
discourse. The 'clash of civilisations' thesis epitomised by Samuel P 
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Huntington, where Islam is portrayed as a 'single, coherent entity', 
posits that Islam is forever and inevitably on a path towards violent 
conflict with 'the West'. 61 Huntington writes: 
So long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West 
remains the West (which is more dubious), this fundamen-
tal conflict between two great civilisations and ways of life 
will continue to define their relations to the future even as 
it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries. 62 
Such essentialist generalisations deny Islam its diversity in 
terms of character, practices and beliefs, and present Muslims as 
having intrinsic natures that are mostly discussed pejoratively. This 
shows that well before September 11 the Western imaginary 
constructed an Islamic totality that is essentially and unavoidably in 
conflict with the West. The social and psychological impacts of global 
politics and security events on Muslim- Australians, therefore, need 
to be understood as being a continuation of a history of antagonism 
and misunderstanding towards Islam by many sections of Western 
society. 
This discussion of the experience of Muslim Australians post-
September 11 recalls the monolith of derogatory and stereotypical 
images of Islam that Said describes, and places anti-Muslim senti-
ment in Australia within this historical perspective. Contemporary 
global political events involving Muslims have undoubtedly contrib-
uted much to Australia's fortress mentality. However, whatever we 
might say about our diverse background, the Anglo-Celtic cultural 
influence in Australia is still the most dominant of the historical and 
local factors outlined. Negative attitudes towards Muslim Australians 
must be understood in light of these inter-related factors which 
include: media (mis)representations; social policies (in the form of a 
folkloric version of multiculturalism in its view of ethnic culture); 
Australia's historical alliance with the West; as well as the deep influ-
ence of orientalist discourse on perceptions of Islam and the East. In 
Australia, the situation for Muslims and Arabs is further compounded 
by current political debates about 'national security' and ongoing 
public division over the detention of asylum seekers, many of whom 
are Iraqi and Afghani. As Said proposes, the mere use of the term 
28 Belonging and Identity among Australian Muslims 
'Islam' to either explain or indiscriminately condemn the diverse 
Islamic world is an irresponsible over-generalisation that is problem-
atic, counterproductive and one that would be unacceptable if 
applied to any other cultural or demographic group.63 
The empirical evidence reported in this chapter shows a high 
level of anti-Muslim views within Australia in response to recent 
international events. The literature on this matter supports the view 
that Muslim Australians have experienced an increase in levels of 
discrimination in response to specific terrorist attacks and the 'War 
on Terror'.64 Media and policy views that are directly or indirectly 
hostile to Muslim communities have the potential to influence a 
population characterised by heightened anxieties and feelings of 
insecurity in the context of the current international security 
environment. 
Since 1997 and Pauline Hanson's corrosive influence on 
national politics at the time, cultural unity has been perceived by 
conservatives to be under threat from multiculturalism, which was 
painted as potentially 'divisive', and the recognition of different 
cultural groups, in particular Muslims and Asians, presented as 
threatening to 'integration and pride in being [an] Australian'. 65 
Within such conservative populist thinking about multiculturalism 
and immigration, 'the existence of difference within a community is 
strongly coded as disunity, as a pathogen or weakness'. 66 It is within 
this political and social climate that immigrant Islam in Australia, 
because of its cultural difference and pronounced visibility in a 
predominantly secular society, has been constructed as a threat to 
social homogeneity, and increasingly as a potential risk to national 
security in the age of 'war on terror'. What is needed, therefore, is not 
only an emphasis on a normative construction of citizenship and 
belonging but also a more strengthened focus on grassroots 
approaches to moral universalism and cosmopolitanism.67 Within 
such an approach, classical understandings and applications of citi-
zenship can be augmented by a new emphasis on a discourse of 
human rights that transcends the nation-state boundary and its 
limiting emphasis on political membership and tributary citizenship 
rights. 68 Multicultural societies in the twenty-first century still need 
to come to grips with the notion that national identity and local 
belonging can no longer be dependent on primordial attachment as 
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globalisation intensifies transnational movements and practices at 
all levels. 69 This is why Muslim Australians living in any Western 
emigre city can and should be empowered to articulate a global iden-
tity within an Islamic value system while remaining politically 
engaged and socially active within their local communities. 
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